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Abstract 
With the transition from a flat rate dominated pricing regime towards volume-based tariffs, bandwidth 
is often bundled with specific allowances or overuse-charges for data consumption. One central 
element in many new telecommunications tariffs is the implementation of data caps, which are a 
common tool to address several challenges telecommunications providers face in today’s markets. In 
this context the recent introduction of so-called “managed services”, or “all-you-can-app” offers 
draws the attention of regulators. The term “managed service” is coined by operators to describe 
online-services that have a special agreement with the network operator. These service providers 
agree to revenue-sharing agreements and in turn their customers are alleviated from counting the 
data traffic they cause against their monthly quota. In this paper we develop a framework that 
incorporates the different forms of volume-based Internet tariffs in the market. Furthermore, we 
present the case of data caps in combination with managed services offers and derive the relevant 
research questions. In the following section we discuss the incentives of service providers to become a 
managed service and outline the creation of a theoretical model to analyze the case of data caps and 
managed services from an economic perspective. The paper concludes with a brief summary, general 
implications and a description of how to complete the presented theoretical approach. 
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1 Introduction 
With the on-going transition of the Internet to a universal communications access technology, data 
pricing becomes the main driver of revenues for infrastructure providers in the future. While current 
revenue streams from dedicated services like messaging and voice are eroding, those services are 
being deprecated to mere free add-ons to volume and bandwidth driven Internet access pricing plans. 
That trend is even more pronounced in mobile markets where classic flat rate and pay-per-use pricing 
schemes are dropped in favor of so-called shared data plans (e.g. AT&T, Verizon). However, also in 
the fixed-line business big telecommunications providers foster a transition towards volume driven 
pricing plans to overcome the trend of all-inclusive flat rate plans. 
The discussion about the current deviation from the flat rate dominated pricing regime is closely 
related to the debate about Net Neutrality. The reason for that relation is twofold: 
Firstly, network providers try to monetize the number and type of devices that are hooked up to the 
network. Mobile telecommunications providers push the introduction of so-called “shared-data” plans 
that allow customers to consume the data allowance among all connected devices. However, for every 
additional device (SIM card) providers charge customers an additional (monthly) fee that depends on 
the type of device (e.g. notebook, tablet, mobile). In the fixed-line business such business practices are 
not common yet, but telecommunications providers try to restrict the usage of routers to a limited 
preselected set of devices, possibly allowing them more control over the connected devices in the 
future. 
Secondly, the recent introduction of so-called “managed services”, or “all-you-can-app” offers draws 
the attention of regulators. The term “managed service” is coined by operators to describe online-
services that have a special agreement or contract with the network operator. These service providers 
agree to revenue-sharing agreements and in turn their customers are alleviated from counting the data 
traffic they cause against their monthly quota. For example, if a video-streaming provider becomes a 
managed service in the network of one specific network operator, all customers of this specific 
network operator that subscribe to the music-streaming service can use the offer as if it is provided by 
a data flat rate (e.g. Lunden, 2012). As can readily be seen, a business model based on selling 
managed service entitlements can only be sustainable if flat rate pricing is not available to Internet 
access customers and the available data volume per billing period is limited.  
From a regulatory perspective business models like that are probably harmful to the Internet 
ecosystem. Managed services reopen the discussion about two-sided pricing mechanisms in the 
Internet, known from the Net Neutrality debate. As Krämer, Wiewiorra and Weinhardt (2013) argue, 
two-sided pricing mechanisms introduce a combination of additional regulatory problems that could 
even be intensified by the selective exemption of certain services from data caps. While the Internet 
currently provides a level playing field for all service providers, managed service entitlements can lead 
to situations where users subscribe to service providers, for the exemption of the data consumption. 
This paper outlines a first approach to understand and systematically analyze current and future 
business models based on data caps and their impact on customer behavior, as well as on the service 
provider market. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First we develop a framework 
that incorporates the different forms of volume-based Internet tariffs that can currently be observed in 
telecommunications markets. In the subsequent section we present the case of data caps in 
combination with managed service offers and derive the relevant research questions. In following 
section we discuss the incentives of service providers to become a managed service and outline the 
creation of a theoretical model to analyze the case of data caps and managed services from an 
economic perspective. The paper concludes with a brief summary, general implications and a 
description of how to complete the presented theoretical approach. 
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2 From flat rates to data caps 
2.1 Classic forms of data pricing 
Network providers historically rely only on a limited amount of parameters to price discriminate 
between their access products. All parameters that have been used in the past are based on technical 
aspects of the network connection. Those parameters include: 
• Time (e.g. price per minute varies between day and night or workday and weekend) 
• Bandwidth (e.g. access to DSL/VDSL/Fibre or UMTS/LTE) 
• Volume (e.g. price per Kilobyte/Megabyte) 
Historically time-based pricing was the dominant Internet access-pricing scheme. In the early days of 
mobile telecommunications, data consumption (e.g. via GPRS, EDGE) was priced predominantly by 
data-blocks (e.g. per 10KB). With the rise of broadband access technologies like DSL, Cable, VDSL 
and fibre, the maximum throughput was the unique selling point for new Internet access products. 
Internet connections could be established without utilizing the dial-up infrastructure and the era of the 
always-on Internet access begun. However, the value of new high speed technologies like LTE is 
“caused by the technological cost benefits for the telecommunications provider rather than by a 
possible increase in revenue due to a higher proportion of customer preferences related to data transfer 
speed” (Fritz, Schlereth, and Figge, 2011, p. 277). 
2.2 Data pricing in Next Generation Networks 
With the transition from the flat rate dominated pricing regime towards volume-based tariffs, 
bandwidth is often bundled with specific allowances or overuse-charges for data consumption. One 
central element in many new telecommunications tariffs is the implementation of data caps, which are 
a common tool to address several challenges telecommunications providers face in today’s markets: 
• Consumers prefer un-metered Internet tariffs (Kridel, Lehman, and Weisman, 1993; Nunes, 
2000; Lambrecht and Skiera, 2006a) 
• Consumers do not consider network costs under flat rate tariffs, which makes these tariffs 
unsustainable in the long-run (Fritz, Schlereth, and Figge 2011) 
• Consumers are uncertain about their data consumption (Chen, 2012) 
• Consumers dislike bill-shocks (Grubb and Osborne, 2012) 
There are currently three dominant volume-based tariff schemes at the market. The so-called “fair-
flat” tariff is a variant of the current flat rate pricing mechanism. In contrast to data caps those tariffs 
establish volume-thresholds that are used to increase prices for heavy users. Customers that consume 
below the volume-threshold pay the standard flat rate price, whereas customers that exceed the fair-
use level pay a predefined premium in that billing-period. Often providers notify users about their 
actual consumption and warn them if they are about to exceed the fair-use level. Some providers are 
even charging the additional fee only after repeated overuse (e.g. two months in a row). However, 
overall consumption under fair-flat tariffs is not limited. 
Three-part tariffs are not limited in data consumption as well. “A three-part tariff is defined by an 
access price, an allowance, and a marginal price for any usage in excess of the allowance.“ 
(Lambrecht, Seim, and Skiera, 2007 p.698) Consumers with a three-part tariff pay for any usage in 
excess of their allowance and can end up with relatively high cost for their additional data 
consumption. That risk for bill-shocks makes the tariff unattractive from a customer perspective 
because it adds a pay-per-use element to the already uncertain and unpredictable demand for data 
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consumption. In contrast to three-part tariffs in voice communication, consumers can only imperfectly 
monitor their data consumption to determine their remaining allowance. Video-streaming for example 
can consume the whole allowance in a short time. 
Both pricing schemes do not fully address the desire of customers for a predictable bill at the end of a 
billing period. Fair-flat tariffs at least define an upper bound to the overall bill and allow for unlimited 
data consumption at the highest price point. 
Data caps on the other hand are the dominant volume-based tariff scheme in mobile Internet access, 
but are more and more common in fixed-line Internet access as well. Tariffs with data caps are very 
often sold under the flat rate label. However, in contrast to flat rate tariffs consumption under data 
caps is strictly limited and overuse requires direct customer action. The enforcement of data caps can 
either have the form of immediate disruption of the Internet service, or of artificial quality degradation 
of the connection. For example, many mobile network operators reduce the bandwidth of the 
connection to the level of 6.8KB/sec (equivalent to ISDN line speed) when the cap is reached. That 
form of “soft enforcement” allows operators to make the claim of unlimited Internet usage in their 
marketing campaigns, without loosing the important aspect of volume-based price discrimination. 
When the cap is reached, customers often have the option to pay an additional fee to continue to be 
able to use the Internet or to restore the full speed of the connection. Providers either charge customers 
to reset their original quota-limit, or to buy an additional predefined data-volume. 
 
Figure 1 Data tariff framework 
3 Rationing Internet access 
Data caps are a form of rationing of consumer demand for data-services. Preventing any form of 
overuse (as shown in Figure 1) is described as direct rationing. That situation can be compared to the 
point-rationing systems after the Second World War. Consumers were given points that could be 
exchanged for scarce resources (e.g. food, cloth) (Rothschild, 1945). Prices for those goods in the 
virtual point currency were determined according to the level of scarcity of the goods. Consumers had 
to make trade-offs between their preferences, their basic needs and the scarcity of the goods according 
to the prices in the virtual rationing currency. Rationing theory yields some very intuitive, but 
insightful results that are transferrable to the theory of capped Internet tariffs. Under rationing of 
goods the consumption of non-rationed complements goes down, whereas the consumption of non-
rationed substitutes is increased (Tobin, 1952). 
That result has direct implications for Internet markets. If data caps are becoming the dominant pricing 
scheme for Internet access, managed service entitlements, or “all-you-can-app” offers are the only 
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non-rationed alternative. Consumers have to trade-off the value and data-intensity of all non-managed 
services (Barbagallo, 2013). Data-intensity (e.g. data volume necessary to watch one Youtube video) 
is comparable to the (exogenous) price in a virtual point rationing system. Rationing therefore 
introduces a second budget constraint into the customer’s decision problem. Under direct rationing the 
customer is not able to make exchanges between the two currencies (money and data-volume). 
Rationing is only implicit, if consumers are able to buy additional rationing points (data-volume) after 
they used their initial allowance. However, the exchange is only possible in one direction, as 
remaining data-volume cannot be used for other purposes and is not transferable. Another important 
aspect of rationing is the inability for savings. Rationing points can only be used in one time-period 
and become useless in the next period. The same holds true for data caps that represent the upper 
bound of data-consumption in one billing-period. 
So far it is an open question if rationing by means of data caps is potentially harmful from a regulatory 
perspective and how such business models could reshape the service landscape in the Internet. To this 
end we outline the creation of a theoretical economic model to compare three scenarios against each 
other. The benchmark case is the current flat rate pricing regime, which will be compared to the 
scenario of data caps. In this specific scenario we do not consider additional revenues form selling 
managed service entitlements. This allows us to disentangle the effect of introducing managed services 
from the effect of solely introducing data caps to the market. Consequently, the third scenario 
considers the combination of data caps and managed services and is compared to the benchmark case 
(flat rate) and the data cap scenario. The model will be used to answer the following research 
questions: 
RQ 1: How does consumption of service offers with heterogeneous characteristics (value, data 
intensity) change under a data cap (and managed service) regime? 
RQ 2: What is the resulting effect of a data cap (and managed service) regime on content variety? 
RQ 3: What is the effect of a data cap (and managed service) regime on Internet service provider’s 
revenues? 
RQ 4: Which of the three regimes is more efficient? 
Research question 1 addresses the problem of how consumers change their consumption of existing 
services under consideration of virtual data costs. The newly introduced budget constraint for data 
consumption on the other hand is a strategic variable of the ISP. The second strategic variable is the 
magnitude of the revenue share, which is only existent under the data cap and managed service 
regime. Overall it is unclear, if the potential welfare loss from consumers using Internet services less is 
outweighed by the potential additional revenues from managed services and the potential cost 
reductions due to rationed data consumption. 
4 Modeling data caps 
4.1 From volume to value 
As mentioned in Section 2.1, Internet service providers have naturally only a limited set of variables to 
extract value from their customers. Due to the on-going Net Neutrality debate business models that 
rely on the provision of Quality of Service (QoS) are still questionable. Consequently operators shift 
their focus to data-tariffs with caps. Caps allow operators to price discriminate between their 
customers according to their (average) data consumption. The cap and the absence of an immediate 
pay-per-use element prevent bill-shocks and make the tariff more attractive compared to e.g. three-part 
tariffs. The reset or extension of the quota on the other hand allows monetizing additional demand by 
customers. 
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However, customers will only buy additional data-volume if the expected utility of that data-volume 
will exceed the price of the volume. The expected utility of additional data-volume depends on the 
services that a customer prefers to use. For some Internet-based services customers already pay fees to 
the respective service providers. Data caps are therefore more likely to harm services that are very 
data-intensive (but free to use) and services that already demand a fee from customers. From a 
consumer perspective the service-fee and additional data-costs to use the service are adding up to the 
total service-costs. 
That aspect is crucial in the understanding of the “all-you-can-app” business model. The successful 
implementation of data caps is only the first step towards a successful two-sided business model that 
enables Internet service providers to extract value from customers and service providers alike. If 
services are very data-intensive but provide much value to the customer, customers will likely pay for 
the overuse of their data allowance. However, if customers are not willing to pay for their overuse, 
service providers may have the incentive to pay for the data-consumption of their customers to 
facilitate the usage of their service. 
That logic may hold true for profitable data intensive services that are still free to use (e.g. Youtube) 
and premium services that already require subscriptions from their customers (e.g. Spotify, Netflix). 
Figure 2 shows a simplified two-sided market and the revenue streams to the Internet service provider 
as described above. 
 
Figure 2 Managed services and two-sided pricing 
To better understand the incentive for e.g. premium service providers to become a managed service, 
consider the following simplified example: Consumer X has a willingness-to-pay for streaming a 
movie of 5$. Streaming provider Y offers a movie that consumer X want’s to watch for a rental price 
of 5$. Consumer X has already reached his monthly data cap by consuming other services and would 
have to pay 1$ for each additional 1GB of data. Considering the size of movies (above 1GB), 
consumer X will refrain from buying the movie due to the total service costs of at least 6$. 
Furthermore, consider streaming provider Y has variable costs of 4$ (e.g. royalties, hosting) for every 
movie he rents to his customers. If provider Y has the option to conclude a revenue sharing agreement 
with the ISP and become a managed service, renting the movie is still profitable up to the point where 
(1-revenueshare)*5$ = 4$. Note, that the example does not consider two effects that could possibly 
arise under other circumstances. Firstly, the logic of the example only applies to those cases when the 
customer has already reached the cap. As a managed service the service provider has to share his total 
revenue from all requests from the Internet service provider’s customer base. That includes also those 
requests that would still be served under the customers cap and would therefore be made independent 
of the status as managed service. Secondly, keep in mind that all requests at a managed service do not 
count against the customer’s quota. If the customer had consumed the same service under his quota in 
a data cap scenario without managed services, the managed service entitlement would free capacity of 
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his quota to consume other services. However, compared to a flat rate regime data consumption is still 
rationed. Smaller competitors are likely to be better of compared to a data cap regime without 
managed services, but could still be in a disadvantage compared to the flat rate regime.2 That effect 
will be further exemplified in the following section. 
4.2 Outline of the economic model 
In this section we outline our approach to model data caps and consumer demand under rationing for 
two exemplary service providers (A and B). First, we consider the case were only a data cap and no 
managed service pricing is introduced. For expositional simplicity assume that both services are 
making money only through advertisements and consumers pay only a fixed access fee 𝑓! to the 
Internet service provider. 
(1) 𝑀𝑎𝑥  𝑈(𝑥!, 𝑥!) = 𝑎𝑥! − 𝛼𝑥!! + 𝑏𝑥! − 𝛽𝑥!! − 𝑓! 
 𝑠. 𝑡.𝑑!𝑥! + 𝑑!𝑥!" ≤ 𝐶 
Consumers maximize their utility given by (1) by choosing the optimal consumption level 𝑥! of the 
available services. The parameters a and b represent the value of an additional unit of the respective 
service, while 𝛼 and 𝛽 are saturation parameters indicating how fast users reach their saturation point 
when more units of the same service are consumed. Furthermore, users have to consider the data 
intensity 𝑑! and 𝑑! of the two services in a data cap regime. Their total data consumption cannot 
exceed the predefined data cap 𝐶 introduced by the ISP. If the daa cap is not binding, consumers will 
simply use each service up to its saturation point, which is given by (2).3 
(2) 𝑥!∗ = !!! , 𝑥!∗ = !!! 
If the data cap is binding, solving the first-order conditions yields the following solutions for the 
optimal consumption levels of the services A and B given by (3). 
(3) 𝑥!∗∗ = !!   !!!!!!!!! !!!!"!!!!!!!!!  , 𝑥!∗∗ = !!   !!!!!!!!! !!!!"!!!!!!!!!  
It can be seen that consumption of e.g. service A in the constrained optimum is increasing in the data 
intensity 𝑑! of the other service provider (i.e. how much traffic is generated by consuming one unit of 
the service) and the size of the cap 𝐶 chosen by the ISP. 
Now assume service A becomes a managed service and has to deliver a share of its revenue to the ISP. 
In return the data traffic caused by service A is not counted against the data cap of the consumers. 
Service provider A will receive demand up to the saturation point  (𝑥!∗) by every customer. Non-
managed service B is still subject to the data cap. However, the data traffic of the managed service 
does not count against the quota of the consumers and therefore frees capacity under the cap. 
                                                      
2 There are concerns, that the introduction of managed service entitlements could increase demand for those services and 
consequently the costs of Internet service providers. In turn Internet service providers could ask for higher revenue shares 
over time to cover their costs, which in turn could drive smaller content- and service providers out of the market. However, 
effects similar to the “re-congestion effect” (Economides and Hermalin 2012) are just an additional assumption. A priori it is 
not clear if that the introduction of managed services would increase demand above the level of the flat rate. More likely, 
managed services are consumed up to the same saturation point as under a flat rate pricing regime. Since managed services 
are basically a flat rate for a specific service (paid by the service provider itself) there is no reason to assume the consumption 
would be higher compared to the consumption under a full Internet access flat rate. 
3 Note that the consumption under a non-binding data cap is equal to the consumption level under a flat rate and a managed 
service regime. The service is consumed up to the saturation point of the user. 
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Consequently every customer of the Internet service provider will consume less of the non-managed 
service B or (if the cap is not binding anymore) the saturation quantity. 
(4)  𝑥!∗∗∗ = !!! , 𝑥!∗∗∗ = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 !!! , !!!  
5 Conclusion & Outlook 
Rationing through data caps is a common way to address congestion problems in networks and price 
customers according to their utilization of network resources. That price discrimination potential 
allows Internet service providers to establish new revenue streams to invest in future network 
infrastructure without raising prices for all customers. 
However, rationing of data consumption in combination with two-sided pricing mechanisms (“all-you-
can-app”) can have undesirable effects on the consumption behavior of Internet users and the 
competition between content- and service providers. Recent studies about mobile traffic off-load 
(Marcus and Godlovitch, 2013) show that customers use their mobile devices for data-intensive 
services more frequently if they are connected to WiFi-networks. Such behavior can be driven by 
performance differences between fixed-line and mobile networks, but also by rationing of the monthly 
mobile data consumption as well. 
Furthermore, the introduction of managed services could have negative effects on the competition 
between content- and service providers. If Internet service providers are very selective in their choice 
of managed service business partners, small start-ups could face new barriers to enter the market. If 
one player in a competitive service segment (e.g. music streaming) becomes a managed service, 
competitors are in a disadvantage due to the additional costs (budget constraint) of their customers 
compared to a flat rate pricing regime. Furthermore, it is doubtful that Internet service providers have 
a keen interest in accepting and promoting data-intensive service providers with low revenue streams 
as managed services in their networks. However, awarding managed service entitlements through 
revenue sharing agreements appears to be less of a concern than selling managed service entitlements 
through fixed-prices (cf. Krämer, Wiewiorra and Weinhardt, 2013). Furthermore, the outline of the 
model suggests that managed services entitlements could reduce the competitive pressure that is 
induced by the introduction of data caps. Data traffic that previously was counted against the quota of 
customers is now alleviated and can be used for the consumption of other (non managed) services. 
Becoming a managed service consequently has not only a positive effect on the demand of the 
respective service itself, but also on the remaining services in the market. 
In a next step the outline presented in section 4.2 will be further developed into a complete two-sided 
market model. The additional budget constraint due to rationing amplifies the Internet consumption of 
consumers compared to a flat rate regime. Content- and service providers face a possible reduction in 
demand and can opt for a managed service entitlement to compensate for the demand reduction and 
the resulting decline in revenues. The profits of content- and service providers depend on their level of 
data-intensity, the cap consumers face in their Internet access product, as well as on the revenue share 
that the Internet service provider demands from them for the managed service entitlement. From the 
perspective of the Internet service provider, capping data consumption could reduce the value of 
Internet access for consumers and hence make price-cuts necessary. Consequently, the Internet service 
provider tries to find the optimal balance between the customer access fee, the data cap and the 
revenue share for managed services. The full model will allow us to draw further conclusion about the 
research questions developed in section 3. Specifically, how does content variety, consumption and 
Internet service provider’s profits differ between the three regimes and which of them is more efficient 
from an economic perspective. 
  
Data Caps and Two-Sided Pricing 
 
 
Twenty Second European Conference on Information Systems, Tel Aviv 2014                                         9 
 
 
6 References 
Ascarza E, Lambrecht A, Vilcassim N (2012) When talk is “free”: The effect of tariff structure on 
usage under two and three-part tariffs. Journal of Marketing Research 49(6):882–899. 
Barbagallo, P. (2013). Bill limiting Internet usage data caps could signal next big tech policy battle. 
Bloomberg Law. Retrieved from: http://about.bloomberglaw.com/law-reports/bill-limiting-internet-
usage-data caps-could-signal-next-big-tech-policy-battle/. Last accessed: November 2013. 
Chen, B. X. (2012). A Ballooning Megabyte Budget. The New York Times. Retrieved from: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/09/technology/how-to-budget-megabytes-becomes-more-urgent-
for-users.html. Last accessed: December 2013. 
Economides, N., Hermalin, B.E. (2012). The economics of network neutrality. The RAND Journal of 
Economics, 43(4).602-629. 
Fritz, D. K. W. M., Schlereth, C., & Figge, S. (2011). Empirical Evaluation of Fair Use Flat rate 
Strategies for Mobile Internet. Business & Information Systems Engineering, 3(5), 269-277. 
Grubb MD, Osborne M (2012). Cellular service demand: Biased beliefs, learning and bill shock. 
Working paper, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
Krämer, Jan, Lukas Wiewiorra, and Christof Weinhardt. Net neutrality: A progress report. 
Telecommunications Policy (2012) 
Kridel, D. J., Lehman, D. E., & Weisman, D.L. (1993). Option value, telecommunication demand, and 
policy. Information Economics and Policy, 5(2), 125-144. 
Lambrecht, A., & Skiera, B. (2006a). Paying too much and being happy about it: Existence, causes, 
and consequences of tariff-choice biases. Journal of Marketing Research, 43(2), 212-223. 
Lambrecht, A., Seim, K., & Skiera, B. (2007). Does uncertainty matter? Consumer behavior under 
three-part tariffs. Marketing Science, 26(5), 698-710. 
Lunden, I. (2012). Music Streaming Service Spotify Inks Deal With Germany’s Deutsche Telekom In 
Telco’s Wider Media Push. Techcrunch. Retreived from: 
http://techcrunch.com/2012/08/30/spotify-inks-deal-with-germanys-deutsche-telekom-as-telco-
goes-for-wider-media-push/. Last accessed: December 2013.  
Lyons, Daniel A. (2012). The Impact of Data caps and Other Forms of Usage-Based Pricing for 
Broadband Access. Working Paper no. 12-27, Mercatus Center at George Mason University. 
Marcus, J. S., & Godlovitch, I. (2013). Mobile Traffic Off-Load and Fixed-Mobile Competition. 
Available at SSRN 2342639. 
Nunes, J. C. (2000). A cognitive model of people’s usage estimation. Journal of Marketing Research, 
37 (4), 397-409. 
Open Internet Advisory Committee Federal Communications Commission (2013). Policy Issues in 
Data caps and Usage-Based Pricing. Open Internet Advisory Committee - 2013 Annual Report. 
Rothschild, K. W. (1945). Rationing and the Consumer. Oxford Economic Papers, (7), 67-82. 
Tobin, J. (1952). A Survey of the Theory of Rationing. Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric 
Society, 521-553. 
